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In this paper, we analyze optimal monetary policy rules in a model of the
euro area, namely the ECB’s Area Wide Model, which embodies a high de-
gree of intrinsic persistence and a limited role for forward-looking expecta-
tions. These features allow us, in large measure, to diﬀerentiate our results
from many of those prevailing in New Keynesian paradigm models. Speciﬁ-
cally, our exercises involve analyzing the performance of various generalized
Taylor rules both from the literature and optimized to the reference model.
Given the features of our modelling framework, we ﬁnd that optimal policy
smoothing need only be relatively mild. Furthermore, there is substantial
gain from implementing forecast-based as opposed to outcome-based policies
with the optimal forecast horizon for inﬂation ranging between two and three
years. Benchmarking against fully optimal policies, we further highlight that
the gain of additional states in the rule may compensate for a reduction of
communicability. Thus, the paper contributes to the debate on optimal mon-
etary policy in the euro area, as well as to the conduct of monetary policy in
face of substantial persistence in the transmission mechanism.
JEL: E4, E5
Keywords: euro area, monetary policy rule, optimization.
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In this paper, we examine optimal monetary policy in a medium-sized model of the euro
area, namely the Area Wide Model (AWM), Fagan et al. (2001). The choice of model
is interesting for a number of reasons. First, it contributes to the debate about optimal
monetary policy rules for the new euro area; this is a relatively underdeveloped area of
research so far. Second, the AWM makes some notable departures from the class of models
conventionally studied in the optimal monetary policy literature.
These AWM model features - namely, a high degree of intrinsic persistence and a
limited role for forward-looking expectations - allow us, in large measure, to diﬀerentiate
our results from many of those prevailing in “New-Keynesian” paradigm models (which
tend to be highly forward-looking and “micro-founded”).
Speciﬁcally, our exercises involve analyzing the performance of various generalized Tay-
lor rules both from the literature and optimized to the reference model. Given the features
of our modelling framework, we ﬁnd that optimal policy “smoothing” (i.e. the degree of
policy gradualism) need only be relatively mild. Furthermore, there is substantial gain
from implementing forecast-based (i.e., forward-looking) as opposed to outcome-based
policies (i.e., backward or contemporaneous horizons) with the optimal forecast horizon
for inﬂation ranging between two and three years. Benchmarking simple optimal rules
against fully optimal policies, we further highlight that the gain of additional targets in
the rule may compensate for a reduction of communicability. That is to say, more com-
plicated rules may signiﬁcantly outperform relatively simple (and easy to communicate)
ones like the Taylor rule.
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In stochastic macro-economic environments subject to nominal rigidities, monetary policy
can actively contribute to stabilizing the real and nominal economy. Accordingly, a large
body of work has evolved around examining optimal monetary policy rules in sticky-price
models. These may be backward-looking as in Svensson (1997) and Ball (1999) or small
micro-founded forward-looking models (for early references, Clarida et al., 1999). Such
models tend to imply that optimal policy can be written as (or closely approximated by) a
Taylor (1993) rule. Often such models feature only a small number of states; consequently,
there is only a minor loss in stabilization by limiting feedback to only a subset of such
states.
Policy implications for larger scale models, however, have received somewhat less at-
tention – being largely focused on models which assume that agents are substantially
forward-looking, as in Levin et al. (1999, 2003). Notwithstanding, the degree to which
expectations are in fact forward looking is far from being settled on empirical grounds
(e.g., Fuhrer and Estrella, 2002, Fuhrer 1997). In the light of model uncertainty, a pru-
dent policy-maker may therefore feel startled by the strong emphasis on forward-looking
expectations combined with small-scale models and in solving this may be unwilling to
only resort to small-scale backward-looking models for policy advice.
In this paper, we therefore examine optimal monetary policy in a medium-sized model
of the euro area, namely the Area Wide Model (AWM), Fagan et al. (2001). The choice
of model is interesting for a number of reasons. First, it contributes to the debate about
optimal monetary policy rules for the new euro area; this is a relatively underdeveloped
area and therefore of high value added.1 Second, the AWM makes some notable depar-
tures from the class of models conventionally studied in the optimal monetary policy
literature – these include a signiﬁcant deviation from the strong forward-lookingness and
low persistence emphasized in the recent literature as well as from the compact dynamics
and limited state variables found in such models. For such reasons, the AWM may be a
good candidate for deriving policy implications and benchmarking those against others
in the literature.
Deﬁning policy makers’ preferences as a weighted average of inﬂation and output sta-
1 The model, for instance, is used extensively in simulation and projection analysis at the ECB. See for
example, ECB (2001) and the references in Section 3.
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optimized monetary policy rules and fully optimal policy against estimated Taylor rules.
In doing so, we also assess the optimal forecast horizon in such monetary policy rules and
highlight sources for possible indeterminacy. A key feature of our results is the importance
played by intrinsic persistence (i.e., persistence not introduced by monetary policy itself).
Coenen (2002), for example, emphasized the risks of underestimating inﬂation persistence
in deriving policy rules. The AWM in fact incorporates substantial intrinsic persistence
alongside a suﬃciently rich structure and largely backward-looking expectations. Such
model diﬀerences – from, say, a standard “New-Keynesian” paradigm model – may po-
tentially serve as a robustness check. In particular, we ﬁnd that – in contrast to many
studies, e.g., Levin et al. (2003) – substantial smoothing of interest rates in addition to
that induced by persistence of feedback variables is not necessarily a feature of optimal
monetary policy. Similarly, given the size of our model we ﬁnd that the simple optimal
rules need not necessarily approximate fully optimal ones (see also, Finan and Tetlow,
1999). Finally, we ﬁnd that optimal inﬂation (and output gap) forecast horizons are larger
than typically found in the literature owing to the sizeable inﬂation persistence and the
limited degree of forward-lookingness in the model.
Taking these results literally and abstracting from model and policy uncertainty2, our
analysis suggests that optimal policy should be focused on future states of the economy
and incorporate a broad set of information even at the risk of loosing the communicability
of policy rules. Indeed, gains from fully optimal discretionary and commitment policy are
sizeable due to the persistence of the economy.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the modelling framework. Section
3 oﬀers a description of the key features of the AWM before section 4 analyzes their
implications for the performance of simple optimal rules relative to optimal discretionary
policy and more complicated commitment rules. A further section considers the question
of the optimal forecast horizon. Section 6 concludes with some policy advice and some
considerations of the implications of model uncertainty for the results derived.
2 It should be borne in mind that policy rules of the kind we discuss are to be regarded as broad
approximations to actual policy decisions and trade oﬀs. For instance, other than model and parameter
uncertainty as mentioned above, we assume rational expectations on behalf of both the central bank
and the private sector. Among other things, this amounts to the assumption that the private sector
forecast model coincides with the AWM. Another caveat includes the availability of reliable real-time
data (e.g., Orphanides, 2001).
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The AWM is not derived explicitly from micro-foundations. We therefore follow the
literature in modelling the preferences of a central bank by a conventional quadratic loss
function deﬁned in terms of unconditional variances of inﬂation and the output gap,3
L = min
r {V (π)+λV (gap)+γV(∆r)}, (1)
where V (·) marks the unconditional variance of annual(ized) inﬂation (π), the output
gap (gap) and interest rate changes (∆r), respectively.4 While the policymaker’s prime
mandate is to keep inﬂation low and stable around a target, he may also have a mandate
for stabilizing output around its potential,5 the case of ﬂexible inﬂation targeting in the
wording of Svensson (1999). The relative weight of these conﬂicting goals in the presence
of cost-push shocks is captured by the preference parameter λ ∈ R+.6
A typical ﬁnding in model-based optimization exercises is that movements in the policy
instrument exceed that witnessed in the data. Indeed, as we earlier discussed some degree
of policy smoothing is an established empirical regularity. For instance, central banks may
be reluctant to change short-term rates frequently in so far as it undermines credibility
and inhibits ﬁnancial-market stability – Cukierman (1990) provides a survey on interest-
rate smoothing. Uncertainty provides another rationale. Policymakers may be unwilling
to completely rely on (model) certainty equivalent policy for pursuing stabilization in
the presence of uncertainty about the transmission mechanism, as in Brainard (1967).
To capture such features, Svensson (1999) implements a weight, γ>0, on changes of
interest rates directly in the loss-function. Additionally, to derive implications directly
linked to the current euro area policy environment, we impose an upper bound on interest
3 Subsequently, all variables will be in deviations from steady-state values.
4 Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) and others have shown that similar loss functions can be derived as
a second-order approximation to a representative agent’s utility function in a simple New-Keynesian
model.
5 Note that here there is no inﬂation bias.
6 In a stationary model like ours, this preference function is the limiting case as the policymaker stops
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constraint precludes zero-bound solutions for the nominal rate.
Svensson (1999a) argues that central banks should follow target rules, assuring the
public to enact policy such that it brings internal inﬂation and possibly output gap fore-
casts on track with the target(s) in a horizon depending on policy lags. The form of
these targeting rules that is communicated to the public is potentially robust to param-
eter changes since forecasts themselves incorporate all new information.8 However, such
a strategy may imply rather complex feedback rules, since in principle they would incor-
porate all the (predetermined) states of the model. Nonetheless, in some cases they may
be concisely rewritten in terms of expectations of future inﬂation and/or the output gap.
In general, however, being more complicated, such an instrument rule may be hard to
communicate to, and be monitored by, the public. In our view, Svensson’s framework
might be best described as implementing optimal policy under discretion – we use this as
a natural benchmark. Other authors, like Batini and Haldane (1999), understand inﬂa-
tion targeting directly in terms of a simple instrument rule, the most prominent of which
may be Taylor’s (1993) rule, a generalized version of which is
rt = ρrt−1 + αEtπt+θ + βEtgapt+κ, (2)
where ρ ≥ 0 represents the degree of policy smoothing,9 expectations are rational, and
(α,β) ∈ R2
+, with the forecast horizons (θ,κ) ∈ Z2.10
From an institutional viewpoint, the advantage of simple rules is their transparency
7 We also experimented with a larger upper bound of 2.5 times the empirical upper bound and with
implementing a weight on changes of interest rates directly in the loss function. As one could expect,
with interest changes being less costly, there is somewhat less smoothing of interest rates and a better
stabilization performance. Overall, however, the qualitative results remain unchanged.
8 Nevertheless, changes in the forecasting model of the central bank or parameter uncertainty will
inevitably change the way forecasts respond to state variables and thereby they will change the
feedback rule of the central bank, i.e. the way interest rates are actually set in response to state
variables.
9 Typically ρ is estimated at 0.9 for monthly data (e.g. Clarida et al., 1998). Often ’policy rules’ are
taken from models featuring multiple interdependent equations in which case strictly speaking there
does not exist an identiﬁed “monetary policy equation”. As an example, even under the plain Taylor
rule the ﬁrst order serial correlation coeﬃcient of interest rates is Cor1(r)=0 .95 in the AWM, with
Cor2(r)=0 .89. Hence, parameter ρ taken per se is a poor guide to any assertion about interest rate
smoothing as actually observed, but may rather be understood as a guide to practical policy-making.
10 Approximate and in some cases exact forms of this rule are optimal for a central bank that has a
quadratic loss function over inﬂation and output – as in (1) – in standard macroeconomic environments
(e.g., Svensson, 1999, and Ball, 1999).
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outside world. While it is unlikely that any central bank will follow the literal execution
of such a rule, they may nonetheless be a good summary guide to rule based policy in
general. Furthermore, simple rules (or the implications thereof) are arguably more robust
to model mis-speciﬁcation and uncertainty (see Levin et al., 1999, Levin and Williams,
2003) than policy based on a larger set of states, which might overﬁt speciﬁc model
characteristics.
Furthermore, from an empirical point of view, generalized Taylor rules seem to match
the data well for the ﬂexible inﬂation-targeting periods of central banks in Europe and
the US. See, for instance, Clarida et al. (1998, 2000), Gerlach and Schnabel (2000) and
Gerdesmeier and Roﬃa (2003). In some cases other variables may enter signiﬁcantly into
the rules, such as exchange rates (e.g., so-called open-economy monetary policy rules),
monetary gaps or ﬁnancial market indicators. Notwithstanding, a principal advantage of
even simple forecast-based rules is that a suitable choice of forecast horizon can incorpo-
rate contemporaneous and leading-indicator information and, by eﬀectively accounting for
policy-transmission lags, induce successfully pre-emptive policy, while lagged or contem-
poraneous rules necessarily operate at or after the event – an aspect Batini and Haldane
(1999) call “lag-encompassing”. Second, forecast-based feedback rules are “information-
encompassing”: if expectations are rational, they will incorporate all states of the economy
and make use of all the structure of the economy (though in a restricted way). By choice
of optimal feedback horizons, θ and κ, the central bank can thus considerably govern how
information is implemented into even a simple Taylor rule like (2).
Although the generalized Taylor rule seems to be easily implemented, some caveats
emerge. For example, there may be lack of reliable real-time data (see Orphanides, 2001).
We thus also employ a Taylor rule feeding back on both, lagged output gaps and inﬂation
to assess the loss involved. Further, Bernanke and Woodford (1997) highlight that for
successful implementation of forecast targeting, there appears to be no substitute for
explicit structural modelling of the economy and extensive information gathering by the
central bank. They illustrate that directly targeting private sector expectations (say, via
surveys) may introduce large ﬂuctuations and nullify the information content of private
sector forecasts. The borderline at which the increase in complexity due the information
encompassing of forecast based rules hinders monitoring is not easily drawn. At some
10
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report results for stabilization using both forecast-based rules and optimal discretionary
policy.
Following the literature, in section 4 we analyze the performance of simple rules as-
suming that due to their simplicity, policymakers could credibly commit themselves to
such rules indeﬁnitely. We illustrate that there is a substantial deterioration in stabiliza-
tion performance involved when contemporaneous data, θ = κ =0 , is not available or
reliable, but lagged data, θ = κ = −1, needs to be used to conduct policy. Apart from
these outcome-based rules, we illustrate that a common forecast-based rule with a one-
year forecast horizon for inﬂation, θ =4 ,κ= 0, yields substantially better stabilization
performance, thereby reaﬃrming the results of Batini and Haldane (1999). While it is
commonly found that the commitment value provided by credible Taylor rules outweighs
the loss incurred by conditioning policy only on a subset of information, this ranking
depends on model characteristics. The greater is the information content of other vari-
ables in the economy (besides the output gap, interest rates and inﬂation) and the less
important is the expectations channel (in the extreme, in a backward-looking model,
there is no distinction between Discretion and Commitment), the more valuable will be
optimal time-consistent policy as opposed to sub-optimal (optimal simple) policy under
commitment.
Optimal discretionary policy in the AWM yields substantially better performance than
simple rules unless the central bank feeds back on inﬂation expectations roughly two years
into the future. When we choose the horizon of forecast-based rules optimally (Section
5) we ﬁnd that these approximate the optimal discretionary stabilization outcome. Due
to the more backward-looking structure of the AWM, we demonstrate that if the central
bank could tie its hands, conducting relatively complicated rule based commitment policy,
it would not do considerably better than under optimal discretionary policy.
3 The Area Wide Model
The Area Wide Model by Fagan et al. (2001) is a quarterly estimated structural macroe-
conomic model that treats the euro area as a single economy. It has a long-run classical
equilibrium with a vertical Phillips curve but with some short-run frictions in price/wage
11
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run but supply-determined in the longer run with employment having converged to a
level consistent with the exogenously given level of equilibrium unemployment. Stock-
ﬂow adjustments are accounted for by, for example, the inclusion of a wealth term in
consumption. At present, the treatment of expectations in the model is limited; with the
exception of the exchange rate (modelled by forward-looking uncovered interest parity)
and the (12-year bond) term structure, the model embodies backward-looking expecta-
tions.
The demand channel in the AWM is enacted by short-term interest rates. Long term
rates determine government debt payments but do not explicitly enter investment deci-
sions. The expectations channel in principle allows monetary policy to inﬂuence inﬂation
via wage and price-setting behavior. In addition to these channels, further channels enter
through the exchange rate. Apart from an indirect inﬂuence of exchange rates on domestic
demand, there is also a direct exchange rate channel to consumer price inﬂation through
the price for imported goods.11 In the analysis that follows, one of the key variables is
the output gap. This is deﬁned as the ratio of real GDP to Potential Output, which is
deﬁned by an aggregate Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale
and neutral technical progress. For this, the trend total factor productivity has been
estimated within-sample by applying the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter to the Solow Residual
derived from the production function.
Full model listing and simulation evidence can be found in Fagan et al. (2001) and
Dieppe and Henry (2004). Applications of the model include examining the monetary
transmission mechanism (McAdam and Morgan, 2003), real exchange rate determination
(Detken et al., 2002), unemployment dynamics (Dieppe et al., 2004) and forecasting
strategies (McAdam and Mestre, 2003).
In the absence of shocks, the non-stationary system converges to a balanced growth
path, on which price ratios are constant and real GDP components grow at a common
rate. Log-linearization of models around their steady state values prior to analysis is
11 Svensson (2000) argues that the direct exchange rate channel invalidates the use of CPI inﬂation.
Similarly, such considerations can be considered in line with the debate in Mankiw and Reis (2003),
as to which measure of inﬂation (i.e., “core” or headline rate) central banks should use in their
monetary policy strategies. Since any contribution towards that debate is outside of the scope of this
paper, we restrict ourselves to a consumer price inﬂation measure in order to be comparable to the
existing closed economy literature.
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(e.g., Levin et al., 1999) and without this step a full-ﬂedged analysis is computationally
burdensome.12 Appendix A provides details about the linearization.
In order to shed further light on relevant model properties, we next explore the impli-
cations of several estimated rules in the AWM.
3.1 Evaluation of Estimated Policy Rules
The current model version does not incorporate any estimated rule but rather has been
calibrated to the standard Taylor one:
rt =1 .5πt +0 .5gapt. (3)
We also report the properties of incorporating three more rules from the literature into
the AWM:
rt =0 .87rt−1 +( 1− 0.87)(1.93πt +0 .28gapt), (4)
rt =0 .91rt−1 +( 1− 0.91)(1.31Etπt+4 +0 .25gapt), (5)
rt =0 .18rt−1 +1 .51Etπ
4
t+4 +0 .28gapt. (6)
Gerdesmeier and Roﬃa (2003) estimate rule (4) on synthetic euro area data from 1985
to 2002. While we do not believe the ECB is a direct successor of the Bundesbank in
all respects, we include rule (5), which Clarida et al. (1998) estimate for Germany from
1979 to 1993, as an additional point of reference. Finally, Gerlach and Schnabel (2000)
estimate rule (6) for pooled euro area data from 1990 to 1997. This range thus provides
two contemporaneous (outcome-based) and two forward-looking (forecast-based) rules.13
Table 1 reports the unconditional standard deviations as implied by the AWM of key
variables under these rules.
As can be inferred from the table, the Taylor rule results in large interest changes
relative to the data (σ
emp
∆r =0 .569). Some interest-rate smoothing appears therefore to be
a necessary feature to match the model to the data. Note that the two rules estimated on
synthetic euro data (i.e., rules 4 and 6) ﬁt the historical interest rate volatility quite closely
12 McAdam and Hughes Hallett (1999) survey linear and non-linear modelling solution algorithms.
13 Note that rules (4) and (5) were estimated on monthly data. Accordingly, we adapt those rule to the
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Rules σgap σπt σ∆r σr
(3) 2.028 1.229 1.530 2.327
(4) 2.406 1.359 0.681 2.444
(5) 2.295 1.390 0.389 1.702
(6) 1.896 1.177 0.626 1.852
a For the four diﬀerent generalized Taylor rules the unconditional
standard deviation of the output gap, of annualized quarterly inﬂa-
tion rates, of the annualized interest rate (in percentage terms) and
of interest rate changes is reported. The policymaker is assumed to
credibly commit to these rules once and forever.
when implemented in the AWM. In light of the stabilization gain comparing forward-
looking policy (6) to the other policy rules, we conclude that “good” policy conduct seems
to include smoothing and that there appears to be some leeway for monetary policy in
inﬂuencing the economy for medium-run stabilization purposes. Supporting this, ﬁgures 1
to 4 report impulse responses to a 100 basis point temporary (1 quarter) rise in short-term
nominal interest rates for rules (3) to (6).
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Nominal Short−term Rate (bps)












Output Gap (pp changes)







Nominal long−term rate (bps)
Figure 1: Impulse-responses to a 100bps temporary unanticipated monetary policy shock. The monetary
policy rule is the plain Taylor rule (ρ =0 ,α =1 .5,β =0 .5). All variables are measured in percentage
points deviation from steady state.
The plots show that the monetary transmission mechanism in the AWM features
14
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Nominal long−term rate (bps)
Figure 2: Impulse-responses to a 100bps temporary unanticipated monetary policy shock. The monetary
policy rule is the Gerdesmeier and Roﬃa (2003) rule (4). All variables are measured in percentage points
deviation from steady state.
long-lasting eﬀects on output and inﬂation, with the latter being especially sluggish. In
addition, the impulse responses illustrate that a poor conduct of monetary policy could
introduce quite pronounced noise at business cycle frequencies. Under the Taylor rule
(3), an unanticipated monetary contraction by 100 basis points reduces inﬂation rates
moderately. These reach a trough at a reduction of 0.028 percentage points in inﬂation
more than four years after the shock. Secondary cycles lead to a minor increase in inﬂation
thereafter. The Taylor rule illustrates that while the monetary feedback rule per se does
not feature any smoothing, model properties may lead to substantial persistence of shocks.
The short-term rate is sharply reduced to a level of 5.98bps below steady-state in the
quarter following the shock, from where it returns only slowly to its steady state value,
cycling around steady-state at low frequencies. Output in the short-run is far more
responsive than the nominal side, reaching its trough of 0.1% below steady state in the
quarter following the shock. Again, even in the absence of persistent monetary policy
per se, model features introduce secondary cycles with output being 0.01% percent above
steady state 8 years after the shock.
Central banks obtain a stronger lever on demand components when committing to
more pronounced smoothing. This becomes apparent for the Gerdesmeier and Roﬃa
(2003) rule when implemented in the AWM. Here, the real and nominal sides show stronger
amplitudes, in addition to peaking later. The maximum reduction of annual inﬂation is
three times larger than under a plain Taylor rule, with the peak response being half a
15
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Figure 3: Impulse-responses to a 100bps temporary unanticipated monetary policy shock. The monetary
policy rule is the Clarida et al. (1998) rule (5). All variables are measured in percentage points deviation
from steady state.








PCD Annual Inflation (pp changes)












Nominal Short−term Rate (bps)












Output Gap (pp changes)








Nominal long−term rate (bps)
Figure 4: Impulse-responses to a 100bps temporary unanticipated monetary policy shock. The monetary
policy rule is the Gerlach and Schnabel (2000) rule (6). All variables are measured in percentage points
deviation from steady state.
year later. Smoother transition of short and long-term interest rates induces the output
gap to show a stronger contraction of roughly 0.19% peaking six quarters after the shock
and a secondary cycle reaching its peak of 0.08% above steady state almost nine years
after the shock.
For the remaining two rules, the qualitative behavior is similar to rule (4) with the
maximum amplitudes and the location of these depending on the degree of smoothing
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terized by a substantial amount of intrinsic persistence leading to a signiﬁcant smoothing
of interest rates even in the absence of an explicit smoothing term in the (generalized)
Taylor rule. Long-term interest rates play a minor direct role in the model, so if the model
were less persistent there would not be a substantial gain for the policymaker to control
the entire yield curve. While too persistent policy may introduce substantial ﬂuctuations,
it is exactly the AWM’s persistence that gives the policymaker a strong incentive for
conducting forward-looking stabilization policy.
3.2 The Taylor Principle – Determinacy Regions
The Area Wide Model obeys one principle derived from the New-Keynesian paradigm;
the “Taylor principle” states that nominal interest rates need to react more than one for
one with inﬂation otherwise indeterminacy results, which is stressed, e.g., by Clarida et
al. (1998) both from an empirical and theoretical perspective. While according to loss
function (1) it is apparent that explosive equilibria can never be the result of optimal
policy, we would argue that so would not be indeterminate equilibria as the policymaker
cannot control the expectational errors. Figure 5 illustrates which parameter constella-
tions induce indeterminacy, determinacy and explosiveness in the AWM. In the upper row,
policy does not directly respond to the output gap, while the middle row shows a response
of β =0 .4 and the bottom row assumes a unit coeﬃcient on the contemporaneous output
gap. From left to right the forecast horizon for inﬂation is θ =0 ,4,8 and 16 quarters,
respectively. For each speciﬁcation of forecast horizons and response to the output gap,
the dark section shows the locus of (α,ρ) combinations for which the equilibrium is inde-
terminate, the white section indicates explosive solutions while the grey section indicates
that such policy results in a determinate rational expectations equilibrium. Explosive so-
lutions result when interest rate smoothing is too strong. For forecast horizons up to one
year and no feedback from the output gap the explosive region in addition is increasing
in the feedback to inﬂation (expectations). We ﬁnd that the ﬁrst diﬀerence rule, which
Levin et al. (2003) recommend as a robust rule, ρ =1 ,α=0 .4,β =0 .4,θ=4 ,κ=0 , is
destabilizing within the AWM. As the forecast horizon in the policy rule increases, policy
can be more inert – even superinertial rules lead to determinacy when the response to the
inﬂation rate and the output gap are chosen adequately.
17
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May 2004Figure 5: Determinacy regions. For varying responses to lagged interest rates, the contemporaneous
output gap as well as to expectations of inﬂation at varying horizons, the panels display indeterminacy
regions (dark), regions for explosive equilibria (white) and parameter constellations which result in a
unique stationary rational expectations equilibrium (gray). The top row shows results for β =0 ,t h e
middle row for β =0 .4 and the bottom row for β = 1. From left to right the columns report results for
a response to contemporaneous annualized inﬂation, to 4 quarters ahead inﬂation expectations, to 8 and
to 16 quarters ahead inﬂation expectations, respectively. The grids chosen are 0.025 for ρ and 0.05 for α.
The horizontal and vertical dotted lines mark parameter values of ρ = 1 and α = 1 respectively. For the
case β =0 .4,θ=4 , we draw an additional line at α =0 .4.
Indeterminacy occurs if the policy response to inﬂation is not strong enough. In
line with the so called Taylor principle, for determinacy when there is no interest rate
smoothing and no response to the output gap, the AWM requires a response of the nominal
rate more than one for one with inﬂation. Even stricter, α needs to be larger than 1.05 in
that case. Expanding the forecast horizon leaves the region of indeterminacy unaltered.
The AWM appears to be relatively immune to indeterminacy problems associated with an
increasing forecast horizon. This may be reconciled by the fact that the strong inﬂation
(and output gap) persistence of the AWM both imply a close correspondence between the
18
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 360
May 2004
current inﬂation rate and its expected value several years into the future.Incorporating an explicit response to the current output gap shrinks both the inde-
terminacy and explosiveness regions for forecast horizons smaller than two years. The
indeterminacy regions essentially vanish for β = 1. Overall, including an output gap mea-
sure substantially improves the robustness of parameter choices for the policy rule with
regard to indeterminacy and explosiveness. Results for more forward-looking models, as
for example analyzed in Levin et al. (2003), show that a stronger smoothing of interest
rates decreases the risk of ending up in an indeterminate region while not posing the risk
of instability – a results we cannot subscribe to using the AWM. In contrast, too large
a smoothing parameter may be inherently destabilizing at short forecast horizons. That
indeterminacy regions decrease once the response to the output gap increases is in line
with the more forward-looking modelling class.
Above, we have argued that the AWM presents a number of empirically reasonable
deviations from the en vogue modelling paradigms and illustrated their implications for
the model properties. We next turn to highlight how these features aﬀect implications for
optimal monetary policy.
4 Optimal Policy
Recalling our earlier discussion, the general form of the Taylor rule is:
rt = ρrt−1 + αEtπ
q,a
t+θ + βEtgapt+κ,
where inﬂation can be measured in annualized quarterly (q) or year-on-year(a) terms.
In this section we minimize loss function (1) with respect to the reaction coeﬃcients
ρ,α and β using three conventional informational assumptions regarding the horizons θ
and κ:
1. θ = κ = 0 contemporaneous information (Outcome-Based Rule)
2. θ = κ = −1 lagged information (Outcome-Based Rule)
3. θ =4 ,κ= 0 one year forecast-based rule.14
14 As regards κ = 0, Batini and Haldane (1999) argue that monetary policy can eﬀectively stabilize both
inﬂation and output even through a rule with β=0, as long as the forecast horizon for inﬂation is
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scenario 3, we focus on a one-year forecast horizon, which has been the work-horse in the
empirical literature. Throughout the paper, inﬂation rates are assumed to be quarterly in
annual terms.15 We now turn to the issue of optimal monetary policy conduct evaluated
by the quadratic loss function (1).
4.1 Optimized Simple Rules vs. Optimal Discretionary Policy
We choose the reaction coeﬃcients ρ,α and β over the rule scenarios 1 to 3 in Section 4.
Recalling our earlier discussion it is desirable to have a penalty on instrument variability.
This may – as before – take the form of an explicit upper bound or a positive weight on
interest rate variability in the loss function. In this section, we employ both measures.
Firstly, when we obtain the optimal simple policy for a positive penalty, γ, we use values
of γ =0.01, 0.1, 0.5 and 1.0. Secondly, as regards the precise value of the upper bound,
we consider two solutions: a value consistent with the data, namely σ∆r =0 .569; and one
which is suﬃciently looser but still binding for any type of preference and any type of the
generalized optimal simple Taylor rules (we take σ∆r =1 .4, which is roughly 2.5 times
the empirical value). Table 2 summarizes the results for varying preferences for output
gap stabilization if the contemporaneous Taylor Rule is used. Tables 3 and 4 report the
results for the delayed informational assumption as well as for the forward-looking Taylor
rule.
At extremes, we consider the case of strict inﬂation targeting, λ =0 , and preferences
geared towards output-gap targeting, λ =3 .16 Smoothing parameters (ρ) for all informa-
positive. Their argument is that since output is a useful predictor of future inﬂation there is implicit
“output-encompassing” in this case. A longer inﬂation forecast horizon brings inﬂation back to target
more gradually dampening the amplitude of the real side on the outset of supply shocks. Varying θ
alone then varies the degree of encompassing. Levin et al. (2003) have an empirical counter-example
where setting β = 0 considerably deteriorates stabilization performance.
15 Levin et al. (1999) argue that high frequency noise may lead the policymaker not to base his interest
rate decisions on quarterly inﬂation information but rather on annual inﬂation in order to average this
noise out. We examined this argument for a subset of simple rules. For contemporaneous rules there is
a slight advantage of using annual information in the feedback rules. For forecast-based rules (θ =4 )
this advantage vanishes as one would have expected since in forming expectations high-frequency
noise does not play any role (the model is linear and shocks are additive white noise). In addition,
expected quarterly inﬂation a year ahead is better controllable than expected annual inﬂation a year
ahead, as the latter includes the intermediate quarterly inﬂation rates which are harder to inﬂuence
due to policy lags. Qualitative results, however, did not seem to depend much on this choice.
16 Note that for the direct punishment cases, γ>0, the relative weight on smoothing the interest rate
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λ γ ρ α β σgap σπ σ∆r σr Loss
¯ σ∆r =0 .569
0.00 0.00 0.77 0.24 0.33 2.00 1.19 0.57 2.69 1.42
0.10 0.00 0.74 0.23 0.37 1.95 1.19 0.57 2.59 1.80
0.33 0.00 0.70 0.21 0.41 1.91 1.20 0.57 2.50 2.67
1.00 0.00 0.66 0.18 0.45 1.90 1.22 0.57 2.44 5.08
3.00 0.00 0.64 0.17 0.47 1.89 1.23 0.57 2.41 12.26
¯ σ∆r =1 .4
0.00 0.00 0.56 0.86 1.13 1.49 1.07 1.40 3.97 1.15
0.10 0.00 0.50 0.61 1.45 1.36 1.08 1.40 3.89 1.35
0.33 0.00 0.47 0.39 1.63 1.32 1.09 1.40 3.85 1.76
1.00 0.00 0.46 0.25 1.69 1.30 1.10 1.40 3.83 2.90
3.00 0.00 0.45 0.18 1.72 1.30 1.10 1.40 3.82 6.29
¯ σ∆r free
0.00 0.01 0.43 1.77 2.00 1.27 1.04 2.29 4.85 1.13
0.10 0.01 0.37 1.68 3.83 0.93 1.04 2.91 5.52 1.25
0.33 0.01 0.41 1.42 6.32 0.69 1.05 3.78 6.31 1.40
1.00 0.01 0.48 1.07 9.74 0.52 1.05 4.93 7.00 1.63
3.00 0.01 0.53 0.74 14.71 0.41 1.06 6.42 7.62 2.04
¯ σ∆r free
0.00 0.10 0.64 0.58 0.80 1.63 1.10 1.07 3.55 1.32
0.10 0.10 0.51 0.57 1.35 1.40 1.08 1.33 3.80 1.54
0.33 0.10 0.43 0.49 2.25 1.16 1.07 1.78 4.38 1.91
1.00 0.10 0.44 0.39 3.65 0.91 1.07 2.51 5.27 2.59
3.00 0.10 0.49 0.29 5.80 0.69 1.07 3.52 6.18 3.80
¯ σ∆r free
0.00 0.50 0.75 0.28 0.39 1.93 1.17 0.64 2.83 1.57
0.10 0.50 0.67 0.31 0.57 1.77 1.14 0.76 2.92 1.91
0.33 0.50 0.54 0.30 0.97 1.56 1.12 0.98 3.20 2.55
1.00 0.50 0.46 0.25 1.68 1.31 1.10 1.39 3.81 3.88
3.00 0.50 0.45 0.20 2.84 1.03 1.08 2.08 4.77 6.52
¯ σ∆r free
0.00 1.00 0.79 0.21 0.29 2.05 1.21 0.51 2.57 1.73
0.10 1.00 0.73 0.24 0.38 1.93 1.19 0.59 2.62 2.13
0.33 1.00 0.62 0.25 0.64 1.74 1.16 0.75 2.81 2.90
1.00 1.00 0.49 0.22 1.16 1.49 1.12 1.06 3.28 4.60
3.00 1.00 0.45 0.18 2.03 1.21 1.09 1.60 4.12 8.15
a Optimal outcome-based policy, θ = κ =0 , under full commitment to rule (2).
is decreasing in the level of λ. In other words, only the strict upper bound cases provide genuine
comparisons all else equal.
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λ γ ρ α β σgap σπ σ∆r σr Loss
¯ σ∆r =0 .569
0.00 0.00 0.76 0.23 0.32 2.16 1.24 0.57 2.72 1.52
0.10 0.00 0.72 0.23 0.36 2.12 1.24 0.57 2.61 1.98
0.33 0.00 0.67 0.22 0.39 2.08 1.25 0.57 2.51 3.01
1.00 0.00 0.63 0.20 0.43 2.07 1.26 0.57 2.44 5.88
3.00 0.00 0.60 0.19 0.45 2.06 1.28 0.57 2.40 14.40
¯ σ∆r =1 .4
0.00 0.00 0.54 0.71 1.09 1.72 1.11 1.40 4.11 1.22
0.10 0.00 0.44 0.53 1.34 1.62 1.11 1.40 3.91 1.50
0.33 0.00 0.38 0.37 1.50 1.58 1.12 1.40 3.80 2.09
1.00 0.00 0.35 0.25 1.58 1.57 1.13 1.40 3.75 3.75
3.00 0.00 0.34 0.19 1.61 1.57 1.14 1.40 3.72 8.68
¯ σ∆r free
0.00 0.01 0.38 1.38 1.99 1.50 1.07 2.32 5.10 1.20
0.10 0.01 0.24 1.19 3.43 1.24 1.07 3.02 5.62 1.38
0.33 0.01 0.20 0.89 4.96 1.07 1.07 4.01 6.36 1.69
1.00 0.01 0.14 0.64 6.67 0.96 1.07 5.35 7.11 2.35
3.00 0.01 0.04 0.53 8.58 0.89 1.07 7.05 7.84 4.03
¯ σ∆r free
0.00 0.10 0.60 0.53 0.82 1.83 1.13 1.12 3.72 1.40
0.10 0.10 0.44 0.52 1.31 1.63 1.11 1.37 3.87 1.69
0.33 0.10 0.32 0.43 2.07 1.45 1.10 1.81 4.34 2.24
1.00 0.10 0.27 0.31 3.16 1.25 1.09 2.58 5.18 3.42
3.00 0.10 0.24 0.22 4.60 1.08 1.08 3.70 6.13 6.06
¯ σ∆r free
0.00 0.50 0.72 0.28 0.40 2.09 1.20 0.67 2.92 1.67
0.10 0.50 0.63 0.31 0.56 1.95 1.18 0.77 2.96 2.08
0.33 0.50 0.48 0.31 0.93 1.78 1.16 0.98 3.19 2.88
1.00 0.50 0.35 0.25 1.56 1.58 1.13 1.39 3.72 4.73
3.00 0.50 0.29 0.18 2.53 1.36 1.10 2.09 4.63 8.92
¯ σ∆r free
0.00 1.00 0.77 0.21 0.29 2.19 1.25 0.53 2.64 1.85
0.10 1.00 0.70 0.24 0.38 2.09 1.23 0.60 2.66 2.31
0.33 1.00 0.58 0.26 0.61 1.93 1.20 0.75 2.81 3.24
1.00 1.00 0.42 0.24 1.09 1.73 1.16 1.05 3.22 5.44
3.00 1.00 0.32 0.19 1.86 1.50 1.12 1.58 3.98 10.55
a Optimal lagged information policy, θ = κ = −1, under full commitment to rule (2).
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λ γ ρ α β σgap σπ σ∆r σr Loss
¯ σ∆r =0 .569
0.00 0.00 0.67 1.12 0.21 1.83 1.09 0.57 2.56 1.18
0.10 0.00 0.64 1.05 0.26 1.78 1.09 0.57 2.46 1.50
0.33 0.00 0.61 0.97 0.31 1.76 1.10 0.57 2.39 2.23
1.00 0.00 0.59 0.89 0.36 1.75 1.11 0.57 2.34 4.27
3.00 0.00 0.57 0.84 0.38 1.74 1.11 0.57 2.31 10.35
¯ σ∆r =1 .4
0.00 0.00 0.52 3.84 0.46 1.49 0.99 1.40 3.84 0.97
0.10 0.00 0.50 3.04 0.85 1.31 1.00 1.40 3.75 1.16
0.33 0.00 0.49 2.35 1.12 1.25 1.01 1.40 3.76 1.54
1.00 0.00 0.48 1.88 1.28 1.23 1.02 1.40 3.76 2.56
3.00 0.00 0.47 1.65 1.35 1.23 1.03 1.40 3.76 5.58
¯ σ∆r free
0.00 0.01 0.45 7.65 0.57 1.46 0.95 2.36 5.11 0.96
0.10 0.01 0.39 6.89 1.96 1.02 0.96 2.67 5.12 1.11
0.33 0.01 0.39 6.35 4.20 0.74 0.99 3.46 5.85 1.28
1.00 0.01 0.42 5.39 7.74 0.54 1.01 4.61 6.64 1.53
3.00 0.01 0.46 4.37 12.94 0.41 1.03 6.15 7.38 1.96
¯ σ∆r free
0.00 0.10 0.58 2.38 0.37 1.60 1.02 0.99 3.26 1.13
0.10 0.10 0.52 2.56 0.71 1.39 1.01 1.22 3.50 1.35
0.33 0.10 0.47 2.79 1.41 1.15 1.00 1.65 4.11 1.72
1.00 0.10 0.45 2.95 2.71 0.90 1.01 2.37 5.01 2.39
3.00 0.10 0.46 2.96 4.84 0.68 1.02 3.35 5.94 3.56
¯ σ∆r free
0.00 0.50 0.66 1.15 0.22 1.82 1.08 0.58 2.58 1.34
0.10 0.50 0.61 1.27 0.33 1.70 1.06 0.67 2.64 1.65
0.33 0.50 0.54 1.47 0.59 1.53 1.04 0.88 2.93 2.25
1.00 0.50 0.48 1.76 1.16 1.28 1.03 1.30 3.61 3.53
3.00 0.50 0.46 2.12 2.19 1.00 1.02 1.98 4.58 6.03
¯ σ∆r free
0.00 1.00 0.70 0.86 0.16 1.91 1.12 0.46 2.35 1.47
0.10 1.00 0.65 0.96 0.23 1.82 1.10 0.52 2.38 1.82
0.33 1.00 0.59 1.11 0.39 1.68 1.08 0.66 2.55 2.53
1.00 1.00 0.51 1.37 0.77 1.46 1.05 0.97 3.05 4.15
3.00 1.00 0.47 1.75 1.50 1.18 1.03 1.51 3.94 7.50
a Optimal forecast-based information policy, θ =4 ,κ=0 , under full commitment to rule (2).
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policy rules. These values are thus far from unity even for a strict inﬂation target – in
contrast to the results of Levin et al. (1999, 2003) for Federal Reserve Board models. The
features of the AWM outlined in section 3 provide some explanations: ﬁrst, abstracting
from the intrinsic persistence in inﬂation and the output gap, long-term interest rates and
expectations do not play a dominant role in the AWM. The commitment value of persis-
tent changes in the real rates is not substantial enough so as to merit strong additional
smoothing. Second, as highlighted in section 3 even a rule with modest smoothing can
imply substantial smoothing of the policy instrument in the reduced form of the model
due to the model’s intrinsic persistence. In light of the less pronounced smoothing found
here, it is not surprising that the integral control or ﬁrst-diﬀerence rule purported in Levin
et al. (2003) to be robust to model uncertainty, does not even succeed in stabilizing the
economy but results in an explosive equilibrium. These results for the AWM square with
the evidence of Batini and Nelson (2001), Cˆ ot´ e et al. (2002) as well as Levin and Williams
(2003): in the more backward-looking and persistent models smoothing is less pronounced
and excessive smoothing may severely deteriorate stabilization.
Another notable feature is that within each class of policies, the possible percentage
reductions in output variability and inﬂation variability both are small, being close to 5%
and 3%, respectively, for the case of the empirical upper bound. For the contemporaneous
outcome-based rule, for example, output variability is reduced by 5.3% when moving from
to λ =0t oλ = 3, while inﬂation volatility is only reduced by 3.1% going in the opposite
direction. However, this does not mean that there is barely any menu choice for the
policymaker: comparing the economic stability under the optimal rules to the performance
under the given rules in Table 1 highlights that there is a substantial stabilization gain
arising from optimal monetary policy.
Allowing for more ﬂexibility in interest rates shows that the AWM implies that the
largest gain from stabilization can be imparted on the output gap while the reduction in
inﬂation variability is comparatively mild. For instance, for the contemporaneous Taylor
rule with an upper bound on interest rate change volatility of 1.4, output variability is
reduced by 15% while inﬂation variability only increases by roughly 3%. On the one hand,
there may be a strong “exogenous” component in the price dynamics, on the other, given
the long cycles in output illustrated in ﬁgures 1 through 4, curbing real side variability
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on interest change variability, but rather implementing a penalty term γ>0 in the loss
function illustrates that there is a strong trade-oﬀ between stabilizing the output gap and
stabilizing the interest rate, while again the trade-oﬀ for inﬂation stabilization is rather
mild.17 As argued in section 2, the implications of optimal discretionary policy provide a
natural benchmark – reported in Table 5.
Figure 6 highlights for the case of the empirical upper bound that there is hardly any
“menu choice” within each set of policies for the policymaker once conducting optimal pol-
icy. However, as we plot the eﬃciency frontiers for the policies considered herein, there are
substantial stabilization diﬀerences across classes of policies. The respective northwesterly
part of the frontiers pertains to an inﬂation targeting central bank while the southeast
refers to almost pure output gap targeting. Three observations are apparent: ﬁrst, using
current information is substantially preferred to using lagged information. Second, for the
arbitrary choice of a one-year forecast horizon for inﬂation, forecast-based policy strictly
dominates outcome-based policy. Third, there is substantial value added of incorporating
all information into the model as highlighted by the stabilization performance of optimal
discretionary policy. For empirical comparison, we also show two rules recently estimated
for the Euro area: Gerdesmeier and Roﬃa’s (2003) rule with contemporaneous inﬂation
and Gerlach and Schnabel’s (2000) rule with a forecast based inﬂation term. While in the
AWM these imply slightly larger interest rate variability than observed in the data, they
can nevertheless serve as a rough benchmark for the simple optimal rules. In particular,
the Gerdesmeier and Roﬃa rule puts insuﬃcient weight on the output gap and hence does
considerably worse than the optimal contemporaneous outcome-based rule. In contrast,
by visual inspection, the rule estimated by Gerlach and Schnabel, although incorporating
insuﬃcient smoothing, comes closer to the optimal frontier for forecast-based policy.
Simple rules may be argued to be easy to monitor so the central bank may be able
to commit to them credibly. However, being contingent only on a small subset of states,
17 This may even look inverted, i.e. as if inﬂation variability would be decreasing in the weight on output
stability. However, increasing λ alters both the inﬂation-output gap stabilization trade-oﬀ and the
trade-oﬀ between stabilizing either of these and smoothing the interest rate. Namely the latter is
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λ γ σgap σπ σ∆r σr Loss
¯ σ∆r =0 .569
0.00 0.00 1.66 1.01 0.57 2.39 1.01
0.10 0.00 1.55 1.01 0.57 2.28 1.27
0.33 0.00 1.49 1.03 0.57 2.22 1.80
1.00 0.00 1.47 1.05 0.57 2.18 3.27
3.00 0.00 1.47 1.06 0.57 2.16 7.61
¯ σ∆r =1 .4
0.00 0.00 1.59 0.95 1.40 3.81 0.91
0.10 0.00 1.21 0.97 1.40 3.59 1.08
0.33 0.00 1.10 0.99 1.40 3.60 1.38
1.00 0.00 1.07 1.01 1.40 3.61 2.15
3.00 0.00 1.06 1.02 1.40 3.61 4.42
¯ σ∆r free
0.00 0.01 1.64 0.94 2.11 4.84 0.92
0.10 0.01 1.04 0.95 2.40 4.74 1.07
0.33 0.01 0.75 0.98 3.17 5.50 1.24
1.00 0.01 0.54 1.01 4.32 6.34 1.49
3.00 0.01 0.41 1.03 5.86 7.14 1.91
¯ σ∆r free
0.00 0.10 1.61 0.98 0.82 2.87 1.03
0.10 0.10 1.34 0.98 1.00 3.02 1.24
0.33 0.10 1.10 0.99 1.41 3.62 1.58
1.00 0.10 0.86 1.00 2.10 4.54 2.19
3.00 0.10 0.66 1.02 3.06 5.53 3.30
¯ σ∆r free
0.00 0.50 1.70 1.02 0.47 2.19 1.16
0.10 0.50 1.57 1.02 0.54 2.22 1.43
0.33 0.50 1.40 1.01 0.71 2.48 1.94
1.00 0.50 1.19 1.01 1.09 3.12 3.04
3.00 0.50 0.96 1.02 1.72 4.07 5.26
¯ σ∆r free
0.00 1.00 1.75 1.05 0.38 1.98 1.24
0.10 1.00 1.65 1.04 0.42 1.98 1.53
0.33 1.00 1.52 1.03 0.53 2.14 2.12
1.00 1.00 1.33 1.03 0.79 2.60 3.46
3.00 1.00 1.10 1.02 1.28 3.43 6.35
a Optimal discretionary policy under full information. See Appendix
E for details for the upper bound cases.
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Figure 6: Optimal Policy Frontiers. Shown is the locus of combinations of standard deviations of
the output gap (vertical axis) and standard deviations of inﬂation (horizontal axis) for the optimized
simple lagged (dotted) and contemporaneous (solid) outcome-based rules as well as for the forecast-based
(dash-dotted) rule with a horizons θ =4 ,κ = 0 for the empirical upper bound on interest rate change
variability. In addition, we plot the locus implied by rules (4) and (6). The frontier implied by optimal
policy under discretion is shown as a dashed line.
these are neither fully optimal nor necessarily time-consistent in the absence of some
commitment technology. While it is commonly found that the commitment value provided
by credible Taylor rules outweighs the loss incurred by conditioning policy only on a subset
of information, this ranking depends on model characteristics. Most notably the greater
is the information content of other states in the economy (besides the output gap, interest
rates and inﬂation) and the less important is the expectations channel (in the extreme, in
a backward-looking model, there is no distinction between Discretion and Commitment),
the more valuable will be optimal time-consistent policy as opposed to sub-optimal (simple
optimal) policy under commitment. We provide the optimal discretionary solution as a
natural benchmark in the spirit of inﬂation targeting as promoted by Svensson (1999a).
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by far outweighs the credibility loss when we compare the simple optimal frontiers to the
optimal discretionary frontier. Consequently, one might conjecture, that the information
encompassing property of the forecast-based rules explains most of the gains relative to
contemporaneous rules. In contrast to other authors, such as Levin et al. (2003), we
ﬁnd the gains from implementing forecast-based policy to be marked. Table 6 presents
Table 6: Relative Lossesa
Rule % Loss ρ α β
Strict inﬂation targeter, λ =0
Contemporaneous – 0.77 0.24 0.33
Lagged 7.98 0.76 0.23 0.32
Forecast-Based -16.76 0.67 1.12 0.21
Discretion -28.58 – – –
Flexible inﬂation targeter, λ =1
Contemporaneous – 0.66 0.18 0.45
Lagged 15.62 0.63 0.20 0.43
Forecast-Based -15.99 0.59 0.89 0.36
Discretion -35.74 – – –
a %Loss is the percentage increase in loss relative to the loss under the respective optimized simple
contemporaneous rule for λ =0a n dλ = 1, respectively. The Table refers to the results with an
empirical upper bound of ¯ σ∆r =0 .569 on interest rate change variability.
numerical values for the relative losses and illustrates that the gain from implementing
forecast-based policy is roughly 17% relative to implementing an optimized Taylor rule
feeding back on contemporaneous inﬂation. Discretionary policy using all states of the
model by far outperforms the simple rules under commitment (a reduction in losses of
roughly 29% relative to contemporaneous Taylor rules). This highlights that there is
a substantial amount of information in the model for which inﬂation and the output
gap are not suﬃcient statistics. While the exchange rate as demonstrated in (McAdam
and Morgan, 2003), plays a key role in the model, and thereby its expectations, the
28
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 360
May 2004not feeding back on all states. 18
As Table 2 highlights, for outcome-based Taylor rules, the weight β on the output gap
is always larger than the weight on the inﬂation term even for a strictly inﬂation targeting
central bank. While output is not a target variable in that case, it will in light of the
impulse response evidence of section 3 be a good indicator variable for expected future
inﬂation, which given policy lags ultimately is what the central bank is able to inﬂuence.
Consequently, the weight on the output gap term decreases substantially relative to the
inﬂation weight, when the policymaker is allowed to directly react to expected inﬂation.
Our results so far highlight ﬁrst, that simple rules can do much worse than optimal
discretionary policy. After all, in a more backward-looking but persistent framework,
where most of the variables are pre-determined, the central bank needs to take most of
those into account for optimal policy conduct. Second, in line with these results, the
forward-looking Taylor rules provide a remarkable improvement above outcome-based
rules. We attribute these results to the information-encompassing provided by the ratio-
nal expectations in the rule. Despite the apparent structural simplicity of the simple rules,
for practical policy implementation several caveats seem to be in order. The outcome-
based rules are easily implemented only if one abstracts from the uncertainty surrounding
(real-time) output gap estimates. In addition, expectations in the policy rule and in the
model are taken to be model consistent rational expectations. Among other things, this
amounts to the assumption that private sector forecasts are derived using the central
bank’s structural (Area-Wide) model – which may be violated in the face of model un-
certainty. While this assumption also has a bearing on the optimal parameter values of
the rules, its importance may be most obvious for forecast based rules. Consequently, to
guard against private sector expectations not being in line with central bank forecasts,
one may be tempted to resort to survey forecasts instead of applying model-consistent
forecasts. Bernanke and Woodford (1997), however, illustrate that things are not that
straightforward. In particular, directly targeting survey private sector expectations would
18 From a theoretical angle, Svensson (2000) has argued that foreign variables should also appear as
feedback parameters in open economy Taylor rules. From an empirical perspective Clarida et al. (1998)
illustrate that real exchange rates and foreign funds rates could be signiﬁcant ingredients to the
optimized simple rule, although they have small quantitative eﬀects. Gerdesmeier and Roﬃa (2003)
ﬁnd that the real eﬀective exchange rate is just marginally insigniﬁcant, while the signiﬁcance of
nominal exchange rates and the federal funds rate is refuted more soundly. Upon a ﬁrst exploration
we did not ﬁnd a few contemporaneous variables capturing the bulk of information in the model. We
stick to above set of variables in order to keep our results comparable to the closed economy literature.
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expectations mechanism is not strong enough to outweigh the loss of information due tolikely nullify the information content of these measures and thereby lead the procedure
ad absurdum leaving the equilibrium open to indeterminacy. Ultimately then, monetary
authorities must rely on an explicit structural model of the economy to guide their policy
decisions, as we do here, and cannot point at the simplicity of these rules.
In section 5, we derive optimal forecast horizons for forecast-based policy rules. We
will illustrate that there is signiﬁcant gain from an optimal choice of the horizon both for
inﬂation as well as for the output gap forecast. Intuitively speaking, this feature arises due
to the exploitation of all model states (although in a restricted manner). Before turning
to the optimal horizons we brieﬂy highlight the role of commitment in the AWM.
4.2 Benchmarking Against Commitment
Conducting optimal policy under commitment may not be feasible for the policymaker
as it becomes problematic for the outside world to monitor policy whenever it conditions
on a large set of states. For the sake of completeness, we highlight the role for more com-
plicated commitment policy in the AWM. Commitment is by deﬁnition enhancing over
simple rules (given that it potentially encompasses all states) and should also (though
to a lesser extent) dominate the discretionary solution. We found pronounced diﬃculties
in solving for the fully optimal commitment solution and considered that our results for
that solution may not be particularly robust to the way the transmission of structural
shocks has been identiﬁed.19 We resort to an approximation of the ﬁrst best commitment
solution. Giannoni and Woodford (2003) have shown theoretically that the optimal com-
mitment policy can be approximated closely by a generalized Taylor rule which in addition
to the contemporaneous feedback contains enough lags and expectational leads of the tar-
get variables themselves. While for smaller more forward-looking models the number of
lags and leads needed is rather contained, apparently this is not the case for a model
19 As regards the computation, the AWM even after linearization is nearly non-stationary due to the
“exogenous” processes. For numeric reasons, it is impossible to solve the model augmented by the
costates as in Dennis (2001) by AIM. When resorting to Sims’ (2001) procedure, the determinacy
conditions yield one loose endogenous error, rendering the equilibrium indeterminate. As Lubik and
Schorfheide (2003) highlight, in that case not only might sunspot shocks eﬀect the economy, but also
the transmission of structural shocks through the model is not uniquely determined. We overrode the
indeterminacy issue and used the identiﬁcation provided by Sims. This resulted in discretion being
20% to 70% worse than commitment. These values are larger than in the literature and somewhat
surprising given the limited role of expectations in the AWM. Since these results suﬀer from the
identiﬁcation problem mentioned above, we do not consider these to be reliable. For completeness,
we nevertheless report these results in Appendix F.
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7 displays the losses involved when committing to an optimized rule with a total of ten
lags and three expectational leads – and hence 41 free parameters. The ﬁnal row reports
results for four lags and six leads. As is apparent, the gains over optimal discretionary
Table 7: Pseudo-Commitmenta
λ γ σgap σπ σ∆r σr Loss
¯ σ∆r free
0.00 0.50 1.71 1.02 0.46 2.17 1.15
0.10 0.50 1.58 1.02 0.53 2.22 1.42
0.33 0.50 1.40 1.01 0.71 2.50 1.94
1.00 0.50 1.19 1.01 1.09 3.14 3.04
3.00 0.50 0.96 1.01 1.73 4.10 5.26
1.00 0.50 1.19 1.01 1.09 3.15 3.03
a The Table reports results for pseudo-commitment. The rules include 10 lags and 3 expectational leads
of the target variables gap, π, ∆r. The exception is the last line, which entertains 4 lags and 6 leads.
policy are mild at best. Even complicated rules as these do not improve greatly upon the
discretionary policy and fall far short of the commitment results reported in appendix F
that appear when using Sims’ (2001) identiﬁcation of endogenous and exogenous shocks.
In the framework of the AWM, with a large set of states and high intrinsic persistence
paired with limited forward-lookingness, even such highly complicated rule-based com-
mitment policy does not improve considerably on the discretionary outcome. To us, this
highlights once more that in such an environment, it is extremely important to capture
the information content in all state variables.20 For a comparison, Finan and Tetlow
(1999) report for the more forward-looking FRB/US model, which features roughly 300
equations, that a simple optimized contemporaneous Taylor rule is between 14% to 25%
worse than the optimal commitment solution. If we take the pseudo-commitment rules
as close enough approximation to fully optimal commitment, results for the AWM range
at the upper limit of this interval owing to the strong persistence and limited forward-
20 Optimizing 41 parameters already turns out to be computationally expensive. As the above exercise
serves mainly illustrative purposes, we report results only for one set of preferences. In addition, we
refrain from approximating commitment policy more closely by adding more leads and lags to the
rules. Accordingly, we do not claim that the results reported constitute the global optimum under
commitment but rather term the long rules “pseudo-commitment.”
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by roughly 27% relative to pseudo-commitment. Again, that the deterioration from using
Table 8: Relative Losses for γ =0 .5a
Rule % Loss σgap σπ σ∆r σr
Strict inﬂation targeter, λ =0
Contemporaneous – 1.93 1.17 0.64 2.83
Lagged 6.37 2.09 1.20 0.67 2.92
Forecast-Based -14.64 1.82 1.08 0.58 2.58
Discretion -26.11 1.70 1.02 0.47 2.19
Pseudo-Commitment -26.75 1.71 1.02 0.46 2.17
Flexible inﬂation targeter, λ =1
Contemporaneous – 1.31 1.10 1.39 3.81
Lagged 21.9 1.58 1.13 1.39 3.72
Forecast-Based -9.02 1.28 1.03 1.30 3.61
Discretion -21.6 1.19 1.01 1.09 3.12
Pseudo-Commitment -21.6 1.19 1.01 1.09 3.14
Given Policy Rules, λ =0( λ =1 )
Taylor 70.9(75.4) 2.03 1.23 1.53 2.33
Gerdesmeier-Roﬃa 32.5 (103.3) 2.41 1.36 0.68 2.44
Clarida et al. 27.9 (88.1) 2.30 1.39 0.39 1.70
Gerlach-Schnabel 1.3 (34.0) 1.90 1.18 0.63 1.85
a %Loss is the percentage increase in loss relative to the loss under the respective optimized simple
contemporaneous rule for λ = 0 and λ = 1, respectively. The Table refers to the results with a
punishment γ =0 .5 on interest rate change variability.
less complicated rules is at times sizeable can be attributed to the fact that the AWM is
very much persistent.
A conclusion emerging from the results of this section is that the Central Bank if it is
willing to condition its policy on the AWM framework should take all available information
into account even if this results in very complicated interest rate rules. We next turn to
illustrate the gains to forward-looking policy in a framework as the AWM.
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The more forward-looking a model, the more agents take into account both current and
future policy conditions, thereby in eﬀect reducing the importance of policy lags and
the uncertainty surrounding them. In contrast, as Batini and Nelson (2001) highlight,
in backward-looking models, i.e., in the absence of an expectations channel or with a
large degree of intrinsic persistence, policy lags may be longer thereby leading to an
optimal forecast horizon farther into the future. With too long a forecast horizon, however,
indeterminacy can occur for any value of the feedback parameters as argued by Batini et
al. (2003).21 We turn to the issue of optimal forecast horizons in due course focusing on
the beneﬁts of choosing an optimal inﬂation forecast horizon ﬁrst (which has been most
intensively emphasized in the literature so far).
5.1 Optimal Forecast Horizons for Inﬂation
We minimize loss function (1) with respect to the feedback parameters ρ,α and β and dis-
cretely for the forecast horizon θ for a policy-maker who credibly implements the forecast
based rule
rt = ρrt−1 + αEtπt+θ + βgapt,θ∈{ 1,2,...,16}. (7)
As we seek to derive conclusions closest to the current policy regime as possible and
in order not to overload the current paper, we focus exclusively on the case with an
empirical upper bound on interest change variability. Table 9 summarizes the results,
which ﬁgure 7 illustrates graphically. The optimal forecast horizon for a strictly inﬂation
targeting central bank is θ = 10 quarters. The optimal forecast horizon is associated with
a loss only 1.2% larger than the corresponding loss under discretion and full information,
compared to a 16.5% larger loss with a conventional one year forecast horizon. A sizeable
portion of model information can thus be incorporated by means of inﬂation forecast-
based rules with an optimally chosen horizon. For a policy-maker who weights output
gap stabilization, λ = 1
3, the optimal horizon, θ, is at 11 quarters. The loss in distance in
21 With constant interest rates, the AWM is stationary, but the equilibrium is indeterminate – there are
an inﬁnite number of paths on which the economy can converge to the stable growth path. In the
stationary environment, as the forecast horizons tend to inﬁnity, the expectations of inﬂation and the
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θ ρ α β σgap σπ σr Loss
λ =0
2 0.67 0.74 0.28 1.89 1.14 2.60 1.29
6 0.69 1.69 0.16 1.75 1.04 2.53 1.07
8 0.73 2.29 0.15 1.72 1.02 2.49 1.03
12 0.82 3.94 0.12 1.71 1.01 2.46 1.03
16 0.97 9.24 0.00 1.73 1.02 2.44 1.04
λ = 1
3
2 0.61 0.66 0.36 1.83 1.15 2.42 2.43
6 0.63 1.43 0.30 1.67 1.05 2.37 2.03
8 0.64 1.89 0.33 1.62 1.03 2.34 1.94
12 0.65 2.93 0.39 1.60 1.03 2.30 1.91
16 0.64 4.67 0.37 1.60 1.04 2.24 1.93
λ =1
2 0.58 0.61 0.39 1.82 1.16 2.37 4.63
6 0.60 1.31 0.34 1.66 1.06 2.33 3.87
8 0.61 1.72 0.39 1.61 1.04 2.31 3.68
12 0.60 2.57 0.45 1.59 1.04 2.27 3.60
16 0.58 3.88 0.44 1.59 1.04 2.21 3.61
a Varying inﬂation forecast horizons, θ. The Table reports results for policy rule (7). An empirical
upper bound on interest rate change variability is imposed, ¯ σ∆r =0 .569. Details on other combinations
are available.
loss relative to the optimal policy under discretion reduces from 23.8% to 6%. Similarly
with λ = 1, a forecast horizon of θ = 12 is optimal with a sizeable reduction in loss
relative to optimal discretionary policy. The optimal forecast horizons hence are rather
long and gains are substantial.
The optimality of long forecast horizons squares with Batini and Nelson (2001). While
these long horizons are optimal for the AWM, the mere fact that more and more informa-
tion (states as well as model structure) is implemented into policy poses the question how
these rules will perform under model uncertainty. While we leave this question for future
research, we note that most of the gains are realized already within a forecast horizon of
one and a half years (6 quarters) (see ﬁgure 7) which, we conjecture, will be less prone to
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Figure 7: Optimal forecast horizon, θ, for the inﬂation rate when the horizon for the output gap,κ =0 .
From left column to right column: loss, standard deviation of inﬂation and standard deviation of the
output gap. From top to bottom: increasing weight on stabilization of the output gap, λ =0 , 1
3,1. An
empirical bound on interest rate change variability is imposed.
model uncertainty. A policymaker caring for stabilization is well advised in the framework
of the AWM to react to excessive inﬂation far into the future and not to react to shocks
with only a temporary eﬀect on inﬂation. This high degree of forward-lookingness on
behalf of the policymaker sharply contrasts with Levin et al. (2003) who ﬁnd a horizon
θ of one to four quarters optimal. Again, this may be due to the substantially stronger
forward-lookingness embedded in their models and the lower intrinsic persistence.
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May 2004Figure 8: Weights on the expected inﬂation term (solid line) and the output gap term (dotted line) for
strict inﬂation targeting preferences for varying forecast horizons for inﬂation.
Focusing on the results for the varying inﬂation forecast horizons for the strict inﬂation
target, λ = 0, ﬁgure 8 highlights that the output gap looses its value as an indicator
variable for the inﬂation target relative to the expected inﬂation measure as the forecast
horizon increases. The optimal weight, β is reduced to roughly half its optimal value
under the contemporaneous rule at a forecast horizon θ>5 and essentially reduced to
zero as the inﬂation forecast horizon increases further.
We have illustrated that the persistence of the AWM asks for rather anticipative
policy. Forecast horizons for inﬂation longer than two years should be emphasized in
policy making. We next turn to a joint maximization of both forecast horizons.
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the Inﬂation Rate
Adding to the information provided in the previous section, policymakers may seek to
optimally target both inﬂation and the output gap at lead horizons. The rules we thus
consider in this section are
rt = ρrt−1 + αEtπt+θ + βEtgapt+κ,θ∈{ 1,2,...16},κ∈{ 1,2,...8}. (8)
In order to highlight the gains associated with the optimal choice of the output gap fore-
cast horizon, for each value of λ ∈ [0, 1
3,1], Table 11 reports the optimal rules under
the optimal horizon for inﬂation and output gap forecasts along with the results for max-
imizing the inﬂation forecast horizon only and the results for optimal discretionary policy.
Table 10: Optimized Forecast Horizons for Output Gap and Inﬂation a
θ κ ρ α β σgap σπ σr Loss
λ =0
10 0 0.78 2.86 0.14 1.71 1.01 2.47 1.02
10 4 0.84 2.74 0.24 1.67 1.01 2.44 1.02
Discretion 1.66 1.01 2.39 1.01
λ = 1
3
12 0 0.65 2.93 0.39 1.60 1.03 2.30 1.91
11 5 0.86 1.50 0.76 1.50 1.03 2.27 1.81
Discretion 1.49 1.03 2.22 1.80
λ =1
12 0 0.60 2.57 0.45 1.59 1.04 2.27 3.60
16 7 0.96 1.99 1.55 1.48 1.05 2.22 3.28
Discretion 1.47 1.05 2.18 3.27
a Optimal forecast horizon for inﬂation, θ, and the output gap, κ. The Table reports results for policy
rule (8). An empirical upper bound on interest rate change variability, ¯ σ∆r =0 .569, is imposed. The
ﬁrst row for each weight on the output gap, λ, reports optimal forecast horizons for inﬂation, when
κ =0 . The second rows report the result of joint optimization over θ,κ and the feedback parameters.
The third rows benchmark against the discretionary policy. Details on other combinations are available.
Perhaps not much surprisingly, the largest reduction of losses is achieved when output
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stabilizing the real side of the economy. For a strict inﬂation target, in contrast, the gain
of the optimized output gap forecast horizon is almost nil. Most of the reduction of losses
is achieved by an optimal choice of forecast horizon for inﬂation alone. The most sizeable
reductions of losses when altering κ appear within a more conventional window of one to
two years.
Overall, these results highlight that with optimally chosen forecast horizons of roughly
two to three years for inﬂation and one to two years for the output gap, the central
bank by implementing a credible rule can almost achieve the outcome of fully optimal
discretionary policy – recalling Table 8 it thereby also achieves good performance as
benchmarked against the pseudo-commitment policy.
In so far as a simple policy remains credible even at these long forecast horizons and
in so far as simple policy would be easier to conduct than fully optimal (and thereby, as
we argued above, almost necessarily discretionary) policy, the central bank will have to
emphasize that policy should be immensely focused on future conditions. In addition, in
so far as model uncertainty prevails, simple forecast based rules may be more robust to
model uncertainty than fully optimal rules – we leave that issue for future examination.
While the AWM implies much longer inﬂation forecast horizons than the forward-
looking models discussed, e.g., in Levin et al. (2003) our results for the optimal output gap
forecast horizon is in line with their study – although at the upper bound of their results.
Summarizing, above results again highlight, that optimal policy in the AWM should
emphasize forward-looking elements and should incorporate as much of the information
in the model structure and the state vector as possible even at the loss of simplicity.
6 Conclusions
Understanding optimal policy rules for the euro area is (and will be of) crucial importance
for policymakers. This paper contributed to the debate by evaluating the conduct of
optimal monetary policy in a medium-scale model of the euro area, the AWM.
We illustrate that the model features a high degree of intrinsic persistence, i.e., persis-
tence not introduced by monetary policy itself. In addition, the AWM is more traditional
in attributing only a limited role for forward-looking expectations and explicit micro-
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smoothing and in benchmarking them against fully optimal policy under discretion and
commitment, we obtain the following results.
We highlight that in contrast to small-scale models or the forward-looking New Key-
nesian paradigm models, policymakers may be advised to base their decisions on a broad
information set. In line with recent analysis by Cˆ ot´ e et al. (2002) for example, we ﬁnd
that optimal policy per se calls for rather mild instrument smoothing: ﬁrst-diﬀerence or
super-inertial rules are not, for example, stabilizing in this model or, we suspect, in this
class of models. These results square with the recent analysis of Levin and Williams
(2003) who illustrate that the degree of interest rate smoothing is the crucial ingredient
in the Taylor rule that is prone to be destabilizing under model uncertainty. In the rather
backward looking and highly persistent framework of the AWM, optimal forecast horizons
are also relatively long: up to two and a half years for the inﬂation forecast and one year
for the output gap forecast for a strict inﬂation target and longer whenever policy puts
more emphasis on real stabilization.
The analysis presented here is of course conditional on a single model economy –
albeit one which may well be representative of policy and forecasting models used in
many central banks. Because conclusions about the optimal conduct of policy are often
sensitive to the dynamic speciﬁcation of models, it would be prudent to analyze the
predicted performance of a contemplated rule under alternative modelling assumptions.
We understand this paper to mark one end of possible modelling approaches for the euro
area. Whenever central banks consider a highly persistent model with a private sector that
is rather backward-looking suﬃciently probabilistic, optimal policy should be very much
concerned with future conditions and should seek to incorporate a broad information set
into the policy making process.
Future research should put the results reported herein into the context of other euro
area model paradigms and should seek to extract robust policy conclusions – from as
diverse a model space as possible. Assessing the costs and gains of robust policy making
would certainly be a valuable contribution in advancing the optimal monetary policy
discussion for the euro area.
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By means of the error correction mechanisms build into the model equations, the non-
stationary system converges to a balanced growth path, see Fagan et al. (2001). This
ensures that suitably deﬁned ratios of real variables and ratios of nominal variables ul-
timately converge to a unique steady state value.22 We provide two examples for the
linearization in which we neglect constants and error terms for convenience. In the fol-
lowing, capital letters (XTD) mark variables in the original non-linear model ﬁle described
in Fagan et al. (2001), small letters (xtd) mark well-deﬁned steady state ratios. Italic let-
ters (xtd) mark variables in percentage deviation from steady state as they appear in the
linearized model version. The ﬁrst example is a log-linear equation deﬁning the export
deﬂator, XTD. In the original model:
∆logXTDt = φ1∆logXTDt−1 + φ2∆logYEDt + φ3∆logEENt + φ4∆logMTDt−1
+ φ5 [0.7logXTD/YED + 0.3logXTD/(YWD EEN)]t−1 , (9)
where the φi are parameters, YED is the GDP deﬂator, EEN is the nominal eﬀective
exchange rate, MTD is the import deﬂator and YWD is the world GDP deﬂator. Fur-
thermore, let YFD be the GDP at factor cost deﬂator. We deﬁne price ratios xtd = XTD
YFD,
yed = YED
YFD, mtd = MTD
YFD and ywd = YWD EEN
YFD . In addition, we deﬁne the follow-
ing inﬂation rates: pieen = ∆logEEN, pixtd = ∆logXTD, piyed = ∆logYED and
pimtd = ∆logMTD. All these lower case price ratios and inﬂation rates have well-deﬁned
steady states. Next we express variables in percentage (log) deviation from steady state
as, for instance, xtd = xtdt−xtd
xtd   logxtdt − logxtd and pimtd = pimtdt − pimtd.
The linear approximation of (9) about the balanced growth path, which we are heading
for, then reads as
pixtdt = φ1pixtdt−1 + φ2piyedt + φ3pieent + φ4pimtdt−1 + φ5 [xtd − 0.7yed− 0.3ywd]t−1 .
Elsewhere in the model ﬁle for the linearized model, we relate inﬂation rates to levels of
the respective variables. An example of this would be pixtdt = xtdt − xtdt−1 + piyfdt.
The second example of the linearization comprises the linear GDP identity
YER = PCR + GCR + ITR + TBR + SCR, (10)
where YER is real GDP, PCR is private consumption, GCR is government consumption,
ITR is investment, TBR is the real trade balance and SCR is the variation of stocks.






YET, and scr= SCR
YET. Again, all small case
variables will ultimately converge to their steady state value. Rewriting (10), we have
yer = pcr + gcr + scr + itr + tbr. (11)
22 More exactly, this refers to the non-stochastic balanced growth path. Accordingly, speaking of the
steady state values of certain variables, henceforth we shall mean the constant values of these variables
associated with the non-stochastic balanced growth path.
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appears in (12). Further steady state ratios will appear in other equations. Most of these
can be solved for by using the primitives of the model, such as population growth, the
inﬂation target and the original non-linear model equations. The non-linearity of the
original model, however, prevents us from obtaining closed form solutions for all the
steady state ratios. In these cases we resort to ratios obtained from long-run simulations
of the original model implemented in TROLL. Apart from some ﬁscal ratios, we need to
set PCR
YER and GCR
YER, the ratios of world GDP to home GDP and the ratios of world and
commodity prices to home prices. While these values will depend on the path that the
economy takes and hence especially on the calibration for the exogenous variables, our
analysis did not prove sensitive to minor perturbations in the steady state ratios chosen.
All other steady state ratios appearing in the model are solved for in a model-consistent
fashion using the model-equations.
The current non-linear AWM version assumes that the levels of government consump-
tion, foreign GDP, foreign prices and commodity prices as well as trend factor productivity
and population on the balanced growth path grow at constant, exogenous rates. We need
to endogenize these series for the solution methods described below. The endogeniza-
tion introduces unitary roots into the companion matrix of the model solution as there
is no mechanism within the model to force ratios involving these variables back to an
endogenously deﬁned steady state. For example, an exogenous rate of government con-
sumption implies, and is expressed as, ∆gcr = piyet, where piyet is the growth rate
of potential output in deviation from steady state. As there is no mechanism to force
GCR after a potential shock back to its steady state level (i.e. to the level the model
is currently calibrated to), this formulation introduces a unitary root. Since both, the
calculation of variances for relevant model variables from the companion form as well
as the algorithms to compute optimal discretionary policy require stationary models, we
’stationarize’ the model by rewriting the respective random walk equations as highly
persistent autoregressive processes in order to avoid numerical problems. For above ex-
ample, this is gcrt =( 1− a)gcrt−1 + piyet, where a =1 .e − 6. Note that this introduces
only minor changes to the model, as eﬀects thereof will only materialize in the very long
run. Similarly, we proceed to eliminate the unitary roots introduced by the other ﬁve
exogenous variables. Apart from the estimated parameter values, a few key assumptions
about steady state values are taken from the calibration of the non-linear model version.
We report these up to two signiﬁcant digits: trend unemployment rate (9.1%), quarter-
on-quarter inﬂation rate (0.49%), annualized quarterly nominal interest rate (499 bps),
quarterly output growth rate (0.57%), share of real government consumption in trend
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output (14%).The linear version has been rigorously benchmarked against the original model. We
found hardly any sizeable diﬀerences between the impulse-responses generated by the two
models.
B First-order Form
In order to save on computation time, we transform the model into containing lags and
leads of one period only (see for example Binder and Pesaran, 1995, for how to anchor
leads and lags in such a representation). This explains that while the linear model contains
only 67 ’core equations’,23 it features 145 equations deﬁning lags and leads of other state
variables.24 Together with 14 white noise shocks to behavioral equations, there are 226
equations.25
C Empirical Variance Covariance Matrix and Data
To obtain an estimate V (u) of the variance covariance matrix of the shocks we decided to
use the series in the AWM data set from 1980q1 to 2000q4. The time series pertaining to
the endogenous variables carrying shocks in the linearized AWM have been demeaned and
linearly de-trended whenever a linear trend was signiﬁcant. In order to loose the impact of
starting the expectations and lags initially in steady state (for example, interest rates on
government debt build on 47 lags of the long-term rate), we discard the ﬁrst 50 quarters
of the shock sequences ﬁltered under a white noise assumption and deﬁne the covariance
matrix of shocks by its empirical counterpart, as such estimated from 1992q3 to 2000q4.
We used the Clarida et al. (1999) rule with annual inﬂation rates to solve the model. This
gave the best results among the four ﬁxed rules discussed above in terms of white noise
properties of the ﬁltered shock sequences. First-order auto-correlation is signiﬁcant for
the employment shock, and the shock to long-term interest rates. For the latter shock,
23 Here, we have eliminated the most obvious redundancies by substituting out some model variables. A
few more could have been eliminated that way, however, at the cost of making the code less accessible
for later changes to some of the structural equations. In addition, in contrast to Fagan et al. (2001),
we have eliminated recursive equations deﬁning variables which are not states of the economy (as
an example, the HICP equation is derived from various other inﬂation terms but does not feed back
anywhere into the model) and which are hence not relevant for our analysis.
24 Again, a few of these lags could be substituted for at the cost of more complicated notation.
25 The model features a monetary policy shock, shocks to employment, the wage rate, the GDP deﬂator,
the CPI, investment, price for capital goods, import and export prices. In addition, there are shocks
to private consumption, stocks, exports, imports and a term structure shock. We also experimented
with adding an empirical foreign interest rate shock as well adding shocks to the exogenous variables
(excluding trend productivity and population growth); the ﬁndings of this study appeared to be robust
to our choice of shocks.
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maintain the white-noise assumption.26
D Calculation of Optimal Policy
For the simple optimal policy rules, we proceed along the lines described in Levin et
al. (2001). Namely, we start with an initial guess for the parameters of the monetary
feedback rule, solve the model using the AIM programs of Anderson and Moore (1985),
an implementation of the Blanchard and Kahn (1980) methodology, in order to obtain
the rational expectations solution yt = Ayt−1+But, where A is a stable matrix and u is a
white noise vector of shocks. Stationarity implies V (y)=AV (y)Y   +BV(u)B , on which
we iterate using the doubling algorithm described in Hansen and Sargent (1997). Using
the constrained optimization routine fmincon in MATLAB 6 to minimize the loss-function,
we set the convergence conditions to 1.e-6. In order to exclude any dependence on starting
values, we start the optimization using three diﬀerent plausible starting values. Results,
however, did not appear to be sensitive to the starting values.
For the optimal policy under discretion in our quadratic framework, we apply the
algorithms of Dennis (2001). While for smaller models Dennis’ method for computing
discretionary policy is robust to the starting values chosen, for the AWM the algorithm
did not lead to convergence for arbitrary starting values (although they complied to
stability and rank conditions laid out in his paper). Instead, we base our initial values
on the respective blocks of the companion matrix of the model solution based on a ﬁxed
Taylor rule.27
E Upper Bound on σ∆r for Discretion
Let V (x;λ,γ) mark the variance for variable x that results when minimizing loss func-
tion L(λ,γ) in (1) using discretionary policy. Furthermore, let ˜ L(λ,γ)=V (π;λ,γ)+
λV (y;λ,γ) be the same loss function but disregarding V (∆r;λ,γ). In this setup, we have
that
∂V(∆r;λ,γ)
∂γ < 0 and ∂˜ L
∂γ > 0.
We seek the minimum loss ˜ L such that the bound on σ∆r is satisﬁed. For a speciﬁc
λ, the ﬁgures reported in the two upper blocks of Table 5 therefore are obtained by mini-
26 Again, the key results of the paper do not appear to be sensitive to this choice. We also experimented
with single-equation shocks extracted from the non-linear model and redeﬁned to be consistent with
the deﬁnition of shocks the linear model entertains. Running SUR estimation on the system of shocks
in order to capture joint properties of the time-series and taking into account up to second order serial
correlation for each shock, we arrived at very similar conclusions for optimal policy.
27 Namely, we apply Taylor’s (1993) rule to obtain the starting values. Experimenting with the other
ﬁxed rules mentioned in this study did not show any improvement in computational speed and neither
did the optimal discretionary policy derived appear to be sensitive to the speciﬁc rule used to generate
starting values – in line with theory.
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γ. At each step of the line search the outcome for discretionary policy when minimizing
L(λ,γ) is computed and it is evaluated whether σ∆r(λ,γ) ≤ ¯ σ. Losses reported in Table
5 pertain to ˜ L(λ,γ∗), where γ∗ is the optimal value of γ from the line search.
F Optimal Commitment
As regards the computation of commitment policy, the AWM even after linearization is
nearly non-stationary due to the “exogenous” processes – impeding the solution by AIM
once costates are added. We resorted initially to Sims’ (2001) procedure to identify the
transition of structural shocks. In section, 4.2 however, we illustrate that even very com-
plicated rules under commitment do not go a long way in achieving the sizeable gains
under this identiﬁcation scheme. To us these results indicate that the identiﬁcation, in
fact, may have a great bearing on the policy conclusions. We therefore include the com-
mitment results in Table 11 for the sake of completeness only – but they should be treated
with caution. We summarize the results for the cases with a ﬂexible penalty for interest
rate change variability, γ>0.28 These commitment losses are somewhere between 50%
and 82% of the discretionary losses.
G Sensitivity analysis of results
All in all, the results reported in the paper are dependent on the speciﬁcation of the model
used. As mentioned previously, the AWM model has a substantial degree of intrinsic
(not induced by policy) persistence with long-lasting eﬀects on output and inﬂation in
the monetary transmission mechanism. In view of this, it seems warranted to conduct
some further experiments, involving changes to the model employed. In this respect, it
is interesting to explore how much results are sensitive to this feature of the model for
plausible variants in some key equations. Firstly, the introduction of forward-lookingness
in the wage and price setting block seems appealing.29 Secondly, given the importance
of the exchange rate channel in the AWM, two alternative speciﬁcations were tested, one
with a more forward-looking UIP, and one with contemporaneous UIP. These experiments
give a ﬁrst indication of the extent that the results are dependent on the degree of intrinsic
persistence in the model. They were done for optimized policy under the contemporaneous
rule with no restrictions on ¯ σ∆r. The results reported in the table 12 show that there seems
28 While in principle, a line search could be done to ﬁnd a punishment γ such that a ﬁxed upper bound
¯ σ∆r is met, using Sims’ (2001) solver this proves rather burdensome in terms of computing time and
would add little information.
29 More precisely, the proxy for the expectation term has been made forward-looking by 4 quarters in
both the wage and the output price equations – in line with Dieppe and Henry (2004)
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λ γ σgap σπ σ∆r σr Loss
¯ σ∆r free
0.00 0.01 1.79 0.68 1.68 4.70 0.49
0.10 0.01 1.09 0.71 2.16 4.91 0.67
0.33 0.01 0.77 0.75 3.10 5.82 0.86
1.00 0.01 0.55 0.80 4.33 6.69 1.13
3.00 0.01 0.41 0.84 5.91 7.47 1.56
¯ σ∆r free
0.00 0.10 1.72 0.73 0.74 3.18 0.58
0.10 0.10 1.41 0.73 0.91 3.36 0.82
0.33 0.10 1.13 0.76 1.34 3.97 1.18
1.00 0.10 0.88 0.80 2.05 4.86 1.82
3.00 0.10 0.67 0.84 3.02 5.81 2.95
¯ σ∆r free
0.00 0.50 1.76 0.78 0.41 2.37 0.69
0.10 0.50 1.60 0.78 0.47 2.43 0.97
0.33 0.50 1.40 0.80 0.63 2.71 1.49
1.00 0.50 1.17 0.85 0.98 3.34 2.57
3.00 0.50 0.94 0.93 1.55 4.32 4.70
¯ σ∆r free
0.00 1.00 1.79 0.81 0.31 2.03 0.76
0.10 1.00 1.66 0.81 0.34 2.05 1.05
0.33 1.00 1.50 0.83 0.43 2.23 1.63
1.00 1.00 1.28 0.89 0.67 2.76 2.89
3.00 1.00 1.05 1.00 1.10 3.73 5.53
a Optimal commitment policy using the identiﬁcation scheme of Sims (2001).
to be minimal sensitivity to increasing the forward-lookingness, but there is some change
in the β parameter when the UIP is made contemporaneous. While this analysis illustrates
Table 12: Sensitivity of resultsa
λ γ ρ α β Loss
¯ σ∆r free
base 1.00 0.50 0.46 0.25 1.68 3.88
yfd forward4 1.00 0.50 0.44 0.25 1.78 4.02
wrn forward4 1.00 0.50 0.46 0.25 1.67 3.84
een forward4 1.00 0.50 0.38 0.24 1.77 3.81
een forward0 1.00 0.50 0.40 0.07 1.82 4.20
a The Table reports results for changing the forward-lookingness of the model where yfd is the GDP at
factor cost equation, wrn is the wage rate equation, and een is the UIP equation.
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do not change the quantitative results much, comfort is limited. Most likely would larger
deviations in the direction of more forward-lookingness have a bearing on the results as
the body of existing literature suggests. More work needs to be done in this area – which
we leave for future research.
49
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 359
May 2004302“Deposit insurance, moral hazard and market monitoring” by R. Gropp and J. Vesala, February 2004. 
303“Fiscal policy events and interest rate swap spreads: evidence from the EU” by A. Afonso and 
 R. Strauch, February 2004.
304“Equilibrium unemployment, job flows and inflation dynamics” by A. Trigari, February 2004. 
305“A structural common factor approach to core inflation estimation and forecasting” 
 by C. Morana, February 2004.
306“A markup model of inflation for the euro area” by C. Bowdler and E. S. Jansen, February 2004. 
307“Budgetary forecasts in Europe - the track record of stability and convergence programmes” 
 by R. Strauch, M. Hallerberg and J. von Hagen, February 2004.
308“International risk-sharing and the transmission of productivity shocks” by G. Corsetti, L. Dedola  
 and S. Leduc, February 2004.
309“Monetary policy shocks in the euro area and global liquidity spillovers” by J. Sousa and A. Zaghini,
February 2004.
310“International equity flows and returns: A quantitative equilibrium approach” by R. Albuquerque,
G. H. Bauer and M. Schneider, February 2004.
311“Current account dynamics in OECD and EU acceding countries – an intertemporal approach” 
























312“Similarities and convergence in G-7 cycles” by F. Canova, M. Ciccarelli and E. Ortega, 
February 2004.
313“The high-yield segment of the corporate bond market: a diffusion modelling approach 
for the United States, the United Kingdom and the euro area” by G. de Bondt and D. Marqués,
February 2004.
314“Exchange rate risks and asset prices in a small open economy” by A. Derviz, March 2004. 
315“Option-implied asymmetries in bond market expectations around monetary policy actions of the ECB” 
by S. Vähämaa, March 2004.
50
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 359
May 200451
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 359
May 2004
321“Frequency domain principal components estimation of fractionally cointegrated processes” 
by C. Morana, March 2004. 
322“Modelling inflation in the euro area” by E. S. Jansen, March 2004. 
323“On the indeterminacy of New-Keynesian economics” by A. Beyer and R. E. A. Farmer, March 2004. 
324“Fundamentals and joint currency crises” by P. Hartmann, S. Straetmans and C. G. de Vries, March 2004. 
325“What are the spill-overs from fiscal shocks in Europe? An empirical analysis” by M. Giuliodori
 and R. Beetsma, March 2004. 
326“The great depression and the Friedman-Schwartz hypothesis” by L. Christiano, R. Motto and
M. Rostagno, March 2004.
327“Diversification in euro area stock markets: country versus industry” by G. A. Moerman, April 2004.
328“Non-fundamental exchange rate volatility and welfare” by R. Straub and I. Tchakarov, April 2004.
329“On the determinants of euro area FDI to the United States: the knowledge-capital-Tobin's Q framework,
by R. A. De Santis, R. Anderton and A. Hijzen, April 2004.
330“The demand for euro area currencies: past, present and future” by B. Fischer, P. Köhler and F. Seitz, April 2004.
331“How frequently do prices change? evidence based on the micro data underlying the Belgian CPI” by
 L. Aucremanne and E. Dhyne, April 2004.
332“Stylised features of price setting behaviour in Portugal: 1992-2001” by M. Dias, D. Dias 
and P. D. Neves, April 2004.
316“Cooperation in international banking supervision” by C. Holthausen and T. Rønde, March 2004. 
317“Fiscal policy and inflation volatility” by P. C. Rother, March 2004. 
318“Gross job flows and institutions in Europe” by R. Gómez-Salvador, J. Messina and G. Vallanti, March 2004. 
319“Risk sharing through financial markets with endogenous enforcement of trades” by T. V. Köppl, March 2004. 
320“Institutions and service employment: a panel study for OECD countries” by J. Messina, March 2004. 
333“The pricing behaviour of Italian firms: New survey evidence on price stickiness” by
 S. Fabiani, A. Gattulli and R. Sabbatini, April 2004.
334“Is inflation persistence intrinsic in industrial economies?” by A. T. Levin and J. M. Piger, April 2004.
335“Has eura-area inflation persistence changed over time?” by G. O’Reilly and K. Whelan, April 2004.
336“The great inflation of the 1970s” by F. Collard and H. Dellas, April 2004.
337“The decline of activist stabilization policy: Natural rate misperceptions, learning and expectations” by
 A. Orphanides and J. C. Williams, April 2004.338“The optimal degree of discretion in monetary policy” by S. Athey, A. Atkeson and P. J. Kehoe, April 2004.
339“Understanding the effects of government spending on consumption” by J. Galí, J. D. López-Salido 
and J. Vallés, April 2004.
340“Indeterminacy with inflation-forecast-based rules in a two-bloc model” by N. Batini, P.Levine
 and J. Pearlman, April 2004.
341“Benefits and spillovers of greater competition in Europe: A macroeconomic assessment” by T. Bayoumi,
 D. Laxton and P. Pesenti, April 2004.
342“Equal size, equal role? Interest rate interdependence between the euro area and the United States” by
 M. Ehrmann and M. Fratzscher, April 2004.
343“Monetary discretion, pricing complementarity and dynamic multiple equilibria” by R. G. King
 and A. L. Wolman, April 2004.
344“Ramsey monetary policy and international relative prices” by E. Faia and T. Monacelli, April 2004.
345“Optimal monetary and fiscal policy: A linear-quadratic approach” by P. Benigno and M. Woodford, April 2004.
346“Perpetual youth and endogenous labour supply: a problem and a possible solution” by G. Ascari and 
 N. Rankin, April 2004.
347“Firms’ investment decisions in response to demand and price uncertainty” by C. Fuss
 and P. Vermeulen, April 2004.
348“Financial openness and growth: Short-run gain, long-run pain?” by M. Fratzscher and M. Bussiere, April 2004.
349“Estimating the rank of the spectral density matrix” by G. Camba-Mendez and G. Kapetanios, April 2004.
350“Exchange-rate policy and the zero bound on nominal interest rates” by G. Camba-Mendez
 and G. Kapetanios, April 2004.
351“Interest rate determination in the interbank market” by V. Gaspar, G. P. Quirós and
 H. R. Mendizábal, April 2004.
352“Forecasting inflation with thick models and neural networks” by P. McNelis and 
 P. McAdam, April 2004.
353“Towards the estimation of equilibrium exchange rates for CEE acceding countries: methodological
 issues and a panel cointegration perspective” by F. Maeso-Fernandez, C. Osbat and B. Schnatz, April 2004.
354“Taking stock: monetary policy transmission to equity markets” by M. Ehrmann  and M. Fratzscher,  May 2004.
355“Production interdependence and welfare” by K. X. D. Huang and Z. Liu, May 2004.
52
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 359
May 2004356“Developing a euro area accounting matrix: issues and applications” by T. Jellema, S. Keuning,
P. McAdam and R. Mink, May 2004.
357“Seasonal adjustment and the detection of business cycle phases” by A. M. Mir, and 
D. R. Osborn, May 2004.
358“Did the pattern of aggregate employment growth change in the euro area in the 
late 1990s?” by G. Mourre, May 2004. 
359“The longer term refinancing operations of the ECB” by T. Linzert, D. Nautz and U. Bindseil, May 2004.
360“Optimal monetary policy rules for the euro area: an analysis using the area wide model” 
by A. Dieppe, K. Küster and P. McAdam, May 2004.
53
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 359
May 2004